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1.1. The prevalence and uniqueness of family ﬁrms
A family ﬁrm is a ﬁrm in which the founders or descendants of the founding family continue to hold posi-
tions in the top management, serve on the board, or are blockholders.1 As an important organizational form,
family ﬁrms account for 44% of large ﬁrms in Western Europe (Faccio and Lang, 2002), over two-thirds of
ﬁrms in East Asian countries (Claessens et al., 2000), and 33% and 46% of the Standard and Poor (S&P)
500 and 1500 index companies, respectively (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Chen et al., 2008a). Family ﬁrms
also operate in a broad range of industries. Among the S&P 1500 companies, family ﬁrms account for two-
thirds of ﬁrms in the high-tech industries (e.g., pharmaceutical products, electronic equipment), wholesale and
retail, transportation, and printing and publishing. Even among capital-intensive industries (steel works,
machinery, automobile, petroleum, and natural gas), regulated industries (banking and insurance companies),
and the business supplies industry, which are the least likely to be family controlled, over 30% are family ﬁrms
(Chen et al., 2008a).
Compared to nonfamily owners and other blockholders, family owners have some unique characteristics.
First, founding families hold poorly diversiﬁed portfolios due to their concentrated ownership in family ﬁrms.
Within family ﬁrms in the S&P 1500 index, founding families hold 17% of the shares in their ﬁrms on average.
Moreover, 69.5% of founding families hold more than 5% ownership in their ﬁrms, and 24.7% of them hold
more than 25%. Due to their high ownership and low diversiﬁcation, founding families enjoy the beneﬁt of
good corporate decisions and at the same time bear the consequences of bad corporate decisions, and thus
family owners have strong incentives to increase ﬁrm value.
Second, family owners have longer investment horizons than other shareholders. They generally regard
their ownership as an asset to pass on to future generations. For example, when William Lauder, grandson
of the founder of Estee Lauder, stepped down, he made the following comment: “I am committed to the com-
pany. It’s the vast majority of my personal wealth and my family’s personal wealth – and we fully expect to be
actively involved with this company going forward” (TheWall Street Journal Nov 9, 2007, ‘Lauder Scion Way
Out, P&G Executive Way In’). Such long-term commitment implies that family owners care about the long-
term value of the ﬁrm, rather than the short-term gain.
Third, family members are actively involved in the management of their ﬁrms, either as top executives or as
directors. On average, founding families hold the CEO position in 62% of family ﬁrms within the S&P 1500.
Moreover, 98.4% of founding families appoint at least one family member to their boards, 54.6% of them
appoint two family members, and 22.9% of them appoint three or more family members. Founding families’
substantial involvement in their ﬁrms’ management teams ensures that their preferences are reﬂected.
Not all family ﬁrms are the same. The most important classiﬁcation within family ﬁrms is the identity of the
CEO. Depending on the identity of the CEO, family ﬁrms can be classiﬁed as (1) founder CEO ﬁrms, (2)
descendant CEO ﬁrms, and (3) other family ﬁrms, usually referred to as professional, or hired, CEO family
ﬁrms.2 Founder CEOs are usually charismatic and visionary leaders with great management skills. They also
tend to have a strong will and an undisputed and powerful status in their ﬁrms. In contrast, descendants are
often criticized for being spoiled brats and less skilled. This classiﬁcation is critical to the understanding of the
agency problems in family ﬁrms, as discussed in the next section.1 This deﬁnition is widely used in family ﬁrm studies conducted using U.S. data (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit,
2006; Ali et al., 2007). Using this commonly used deﬁnition is important for several reasons. First, it facilitates comparison of the results
across studies. Second, it is less subject to researchers’ discretion in the classiﬁcation of family. Third, to the extent that the family owners
in some of the classiﬁed family ﬁrms have weak inﬂuence in the ﬁrms, it would introduce a conservative bias to the results. A more
restrictive deﬁnition (e.g., requiring multiple generations to be involved in the ﬁrm) makes the results less generalizable. One should keep in
mind the tradeoﬀ between using a more restrictive versus a more lenient deﬁnition and the most appropriate deﬁnition is likely to be
country speciﬁc. See Villalonga and Amit (2010, pp. 866–867) for a further discussion of family ﬁrm deﬁnition.
2 The name of the third category does not imply that founder CEOs or descendant CEOs are not professional; nor does it imply that
founder CEOs and descendant CEOs are not hired.
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family ﬁrm research. This is the key reason for the emerging line of research on family ﬁrms in the past decade.
This review focuses primarily on family ﬁrm studies published in leading accounting and ﬁnance journals.
1.2. Agency problems in family ﬁrms
The foundation on which most family ﬁrm studies are built is the agency conﬂict framework. The unique
characteristics of family ﬁrms aﬀect the nature and extent of agency problems, which also vary with the type of
family ﬁrm. There are two main agency problems in public companies: the conﬂict between managers and
shareholders and the conﬂict between majority and minority shareholders. Below we discuss the two types
of agency problems that apply to family ﬁrms relative to non-family ﬁrms.
1.2.1. The conﬂict between managers and shareholders
In the classic owner-manager conﬂict, as described in Jensen and Meckling (1976), the separation of man-
agers from shareholders may lead to managers not acting in the best interest of the shareholders. We refer to
this type of agency problem as the Type I agency problem. However, the extent of Type I agency problems is
reduced in family ﬁrms for several reasons.
First, as discussed above, family owners tend to hold concentrated and under-diversiﬁed ownership of their
ﬁrms. As a result, family owners are likely to have strong incentives to monitor managers, reducing the free
rider problem that is prevalent among other ﬁrms. [The beneﬁt of monitoring does not outweigh the cost of
monitoring for small atomistic shareholders, and as such, they tend to free ride on others’ monitoring (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1986).] Given the under-diversiﬁcation of their portfolios, family owners bear the idiosyncratic
risk associated with the ﬁrm and are thus concerned with the cash ﬂows it generates. Founding families’ long
tenure and substantial involvement in management imply that they are knowledgeable about their ﬁrms’ activ-
ities, which in turn enables them to provide better monitoring of managers.
Second, founding families tend to have much longer investment horizons than other shareholders. Their
long-term presence in the ﬁrm implies that family owners are willing to invest in long-term projects. Thus,
family owners can help to mitigate the managerial myopia problem (Stein, 1988, 1989). Because the founding
family views the ﬁrm as an asset to pass on to future generations rather than as wealth to be consumed during
their lifetimes (James, 1999), ﬁrm survival is an important concern. Hence, family owners have even stronger
incentives to monitor than other large and long-term shareholders.
Third, founding families are concerned with the family’s reputation. They are more willing to build and
protect their reputation, which is likely to have long-term eﬀects on third parties, and hence the family busi-
ness. Founding families are likely to deal with other stakeholders, such as banks, suppliers, and customs, for
longer periods. This also gives family ﬁrms stronger incentives to execute eﬀective monitoring than other large
shareholders.
Lastly, in founder and descendant CEO ﬁrms, the owner and the CEO are one and thus there is no incentive
misalignment and no Type I agency problem. Recall that Type I agency problems arise when the owners’ and
the managers’ interest are not aligned.
In summary, compared to non-family ﬁrms, family ﬁrms face less severe Type I agency problems arising
from the separation of ownership and control.
1.2.2. The conﬂict between majority and minority shareholders
The second type of agency problem is the conﬂict between majority and minority shareholders. As they
hold substantial ownership and have controlling positions in the ﬁrm, majority shareholders may seek private
beneﬁts at the expense of minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). We refer to this type of agency
problem as the Type II agency problem. Family ﬁrms have a large shareholder (the family owner) and a fringe
of small shareholders. As such, family ﬁrms are subject to severe agency problems between family owners and
minority shareholders.
The primary source for this type of agency problem is founding families’ concentrated equity holdings and
substantial control in their ﬁrms, which gives them the opportunity to extract private beneﬁts at the expense of
other shareholders. Private beneﬁts may be both the monetary and the non-monetary beneﬁts from running a
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21–28, 2006) comments that “[given his poor performance,] CEO Bill Ford would have been ﬁred by now by
most boards if his name were Smith.” Families are also capable of expropriating wealth from the ﬁrm through
excessive compensation, related-party transactions, or special dividends (Burkart et al., 2003).
Another important source of potential family entrenchment is the diﬀerence between their control rights and
cash-ﬂow rights. Villalonga andAmit (2009) show that founding families are the primary type of blockholders to
hold control rights in excess of their cash-ﬂow rights in U.S. corporations. Based on 3006 U.S ﬁrm-year obser-
vations from 515 ﬁrms between 1994 and 2000, they ﬁnd that founding families on average own 15.3% of the
shares (cash ﬂow rights), but control 18.8% of the votes in those ﬁrms. The wedge is primarily due to the issuance
of dual-class shares. For example, Google’s co-founders, Sergey Brin and Larry Page, own super-voting class B
shares,which have 10 votes per share.Other high-techﬁrms, such asFacebook, have similar dual-class structures.
Foundingowners also obtain disproportionally higher control via disproportionate board representation, voting
agreements, and pyramid ownership structures. Such awedge provides themwith the incentive and ability to pur-
sue private beneﬁts. While families may take actions that maximize their personal beneﬁt, many of these actions
can lead to suboptimal corporate decisions that reduce the value to minority shareholders.
In summary, compared to non-family ﬁrms, family ﬁrms face more severe agency conﬂicts between major-
ity and minority shareholders.
1.2.3. Tension within the family
Compared to Type I and Type II agency problems, the intricate relationships within families are even more
unique and interesting. Family feuds can exist between founders and descendants and, more commonly,
between descendants, due to diﬀerences in their interest and vision.
One example of a family feud between founders and descendants is the Redstone family. Sumner Redstone,
an American media magnate who is the controlling shareholder and chairman of the National Amusement
theater chain, shoved a succession of ‘heirs apparent’ out of the door. His daughter, Shari Redstone, was
set to assume his role. However, in 2007, when Sumner Redstone was 84 years old, they feuded publicly over
issues of corporate governance and the future of the cinema chain.3
Another example of a family feud is the discord in the Georgina Rinehart family. Georgina Rinehart’s far-
ther, Lang Hancock, established the Hope Margaret Hancock Trust before his death, nominating Georgina
Rinehart as the trustee and his four grandchildren as beneﬁciaries.4 However, in 2011, Rinehart’s three older
children brought legal action in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia, to have Georgina Rine-
hart removed as sole trustee due to a commercial dispute.5,6
The tensions within the family have not yet been fully investigated. A case study, rather than a large sample
study, is better suited for such investigations.
2. What have we learned from recent family ﬁrm research?
2.1. Valuation premium
One fundamental ﬁnding in the family ﬁrm research is that family ﬁrms on average perform better than
non-family ﬁrms. Anderson and Reeb (2003) document in their seminal work that family ﬁrms have higher
returns on assets and Tobin’s Q than non-family ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by later studies (e.g.,
Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Maury, 2006; Andres, 2008) and suggests that family ownership is an eﬀective
organizational structure. The questions then are how, which, and when family ﬁrms create value.
First, how do family ﬁrms create more value? Anderson and Reeb (2003) attribute the family ﬁrm valuation
premium to the reduction in agency problems associated with managerial opportunism, or Type I agency
problems. They and others ﬁnd that family ﬁrms perform better when family members serve as the CEO3 Jenn Abelson, “Redstone says he relies on his instinct,” The Boston Globe, September 19, 2007.
4 Hall, Louise and Pennells, Steve. “Rinehart’s children win ﬁrst round,” The Sydney Morning Herald, October 8, 2011.
5 Hall, Louise. “Family feud details to stay secret for at least ﬁve more weeks,” The Sydney Morning Herald, February 2, 2012.
6 Amy Dale. “Days away from being billionaires, Gina Rinehart locks trust for half a century,” The Daily Telegraph, March 13, 2012.
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trol can readily align managers’ interest with that of the family. Anderson et al. (2003) further investigate the
issue from the angle of the cost of debt. They ﬁnd that founding family ownership is associated with lower cost
of debt. This result is consistent with the notion that agency conﬂicts between equity and debt claimants are
also lower in family ﬁrms, and/or the notion that family owners’ reputations and long horizons are beneﬁcial
and can reduce the transaction costs of dealing with other stakeholders.
Another reason family ﬁrms perform better is that they are less likely to destroy value through mergers and
acquisitions. Caprio et al. (2011) investigate 777 large European companies during the 1998–2008 period and
show that family ﬁrms are less likely to make acquisitions and that their acquisitions are of higher quality.
Focusing a sample of Japanese ﬁrms, Shim and Okamuro’s (2011) analysis also shows that family ﬁrms are
less likely to conduct mergers than non-family ﬁrms.
Second, who creates value in family ﬁrms? Some studies show that founders create value and descendants
destroy value (Villalonga and Amit, 2010). Founder CEOs can bring innovative and value-enhancing expertise
to the ﬁrm (Morck et al., 1988). Villalonga and Amit (2006) ﬁnd that family ownership creates value only
when the founder serves as the CEO of the family ﬁrm or as the Chairman with a hired CEO. Fahlenbrach
(2009) documents that 11% of the largest U.S. public ﬁrms are headed by founder CEOs, and these ﬁrms invest
more in research and development, have higher capital expenditures, make more focused mergers and acqui-
sitions, and earn a benchmark-adjusted annual return of 8.3% during the 1993–2002 period.
Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2006) observes that compared with professional CEO family ﬁrms, descendant CEO ﬁrms
underperform in terms of operating proﬁtability and market-to-book ratio. Bertrand et al. (2008) also docu-
ment lower ﬁrm performance associated with greater involvement by founders’ sons, especially after the foun-
ders pass away. Cucculelli and Micucci (2008) ﬁnd similar results based on a sample of Italian family ﬁrms.
The underperformance by descendant CEO ﬁrms is largely attributed to their lack of managerial skills.
These descendants are chosen as the CEO not because they are the best candidates for the position, but
because they are the descendants of the founders. To use Warren Buﬀett’s analogy, picking executives from
the small pool of family heirs would be like “choosing the 2020 Olympic team by picking the eldest sons of
the gold-medal winners of the 2000 Olympics.”7
The third question is, when do family ﬁrms create value? As founding families can use their power to accrue
private beneﬁts at the expense of minority shareholders, the checks and balances on founding families’ power
can help to reduce Type II agency problems. Anderson and Reeb (2004) ﬁnd that family ﬁrms perform best
when the power of the founding family is balanced by the presence of independent directors. Family ﬁrms, on
average, only out-perform when there is no dual-class structure or over representation on their boards
(Villalonga and Amit, 2009). Anderson et al. (2009) further document that publicly traded ﬁrms exploit opac-
ity to extract private beneﬁts at the expense of minority shareholders. They ﬁnd that founder- and descendant-
controlled ﬁrms outperform other ﬁrms only when the information environment is of high quality. Evidence
from Western European countries shows that family control is associated with higher ﬁrm value mainly in
economies with better shareholder protection and country-level legal infrastructure, which reduce Type II
agency problems (Maury, 2006).2.2. Evidence of Type II agency problems in family ﬁrms
Because founding families enjoy substantial control as a result of their concentrated equity holdings, family
ﬁrms have more severe Type II agency problems than non-family ﬁrms, as discussed above. The valuation pre-
mium enjoyed by family ﬁrms is consistent with the notion that the beneﬁt from the reduction in Type I agency
problems outweighs the cost from the more severe Type II agency problems. However, several recent studies
provide some direct evidence that family ﬁrms are subject to more severe Type II agency problems.
Villalonga and Amit (2006) ﬁnd that the use of control-enhancing mechanisms, e.g. dual-class structures,
pyramids, and voting agreements, reduce founder CEO ﬁrms’ valuation premium. Similarly, Anderson and
Reeb (2004) ﬁnd that in ﬁrms with concentrated founding-family ownership and relatively few independent7 David C. Johnston, “Dozens of Rich Americans Join in Fight to Retain the Estate Tax,” New York Times, February 14, 2001.
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II agency problem is particularly severe for family ﬁrms with control-enhancing mechanisms and less eﬀective
monitoring of family members.
More direct evidence comes from the investigation of speciﬁc corporate decisions. Anderson et al. (2012)
examine the information content of short sales in family and non-family ﬁrms and ﬁnd that founding families
are involved in more aggressive informed trading than other large shareholders. Moreover, Chen et al. (2013a)
observe that both founder and descendant CEO family ﬁrms are less likely to let the CEO go after their ﬁrms
perform poorly. CEO turnover–performance sensitivity, a measure of agency problems in the CEO turnover
setting, is lower for family CEO ﬁrms than for professional CEO family ﬁrms. When the family ownership is
higher, family CEO turnover is even less sensitive to ﬁrm performance. Their evidence suggests that the Type
II agency problem manifests itself in the CEO turnover setting and the problem increases with family owner-
ship and control. They also ﬁnd that CEO turnover–performance sensitivity is higher in professional CEO
family ﬁrms than in non-family ﬁrms. Overall, they ﬁnd that family ownership/control is a double-edged
sword: it leads to Type II agency problems when family ownership is combined with family control and
reduces Type I agency problems when family ownership is separated from control. The eﬀects increase with
the level of family ownership.
2.3. Accounting phenomenon
The unique ownership structure of family ﬁrms has important implications for their ﬁnancial reporting and
disclosure practices. In terms of earnings quality, Wang (2006) argues that the incentives for founding families
to expropriate wealth from other shareholders leads to lower earnings quality (the entrenchment eﬀect), while
greater monitoring by founding families implies higher earnings quality (the alignment eﬀect). He shows that
founding family ownership is associated with lower abnormal accruals, greater earnings informativeness, and
less persistence of transitory loss components in earnings, suggesting higher earnings quality in family ﬁrms.
Ali et al. (2007) further suggest that family ﬁrms can address agency problems through direct monitoring
rather than rewarding managers based on accounting performance, such that managers are less likely to
manipulate the earnings. Consistent with this notion, they ﬁnd that family ﬁrms report higher earnings quality,
including lower discretionary accruals, higher predictability of cash ﬂows, and higher earnings response coef-
ﬁcients, thus corroborating the results reported by Wang (2006).
In addition to the quality of mandatory reporting, studies also examine the voluntary disclosure policies
adopted by family ﬁrms. Ali et al. (2007) argue that maintaining the opacity of corporate governance practices
may facilitate family members’ entrenchment. They ﬁnd that family ﬁrms make fewer disclosures about their
corporate governance practices. Chen et al. (2008a) further argue that family owners have a longer investment
horizon than other shareholders; hence, they do not enjoy the beneﬁt of timely disclosure but bear the cost of
disclosure due to their high ownership. Consistent with their prediction, they ﬁnd that managers are less likely
to provide earnings forecasts and hold fewer conference calls. However, withholding bad news is costly for the
ﬁrm and shareholders because of the potential litigation costs. Given founding families’ concentrated and
under-diversiﬁed equity holdings, they are more concerned with the litigation and reputation costs. Consistent
with their conjecture, Chen et al. (2008a) document that family ﬁrms provide more earnings warnings than
non-family ﬁrms.
Because tax avoidance activities are complex and opaque, they can be used to hide losses or rent extraction
by the majority shareholders (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). Building on this line of logic, Chen et al. (2010)
ﬁnd that family ﬁrms are less tax aggressive than their non-family counterparts. They suggest that family own-
ers are willing to forgo tax beneﬁts to avoid the non-tax cost of a potential price discount. As family ﬁrms are
characterized by a unique agency conﬂict between dominant and small shareholders, family owners enjoy
greater share price discounts if they are more tax aggressive, which can be viewed as masking rent extraction
activities. In addition, due to their much larger equity ownership and their much longer investment horizons,
family owners are more concerned with the potential penalties imposed by the IRS and the reputation damage
from being involved in a tax-related lawsuit.
Overall, the extant literature ﬁnds that family ﬁrms generally have better ﬁnancial reporting quality, are
more likely to issue earnings warnings, and are less tax aggressive.
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Because the decision to control a ﬁrm is endogenous, a crucial issue in the study of family ﬁrms is what
determines the ownership and control structure of family ﬁrms. The current evidence suggests that both micro
and macro factors shape the family ownership concentration and the wedge between family control and
ownership.
The majority of ﬁrms start as family ﬁrms. Whether the founders or later generations decide to maintain
family ownership and control depends on the costs and beneﬁts of doing so, and on the structure of the found-
ing family. Bennedsen et al. (2007) ﬁnd that the gender of the departing family CEO’s eldest child strongly
inﬂuences the decision to appoint a family member or an outsider as the CEO. The frequency of appointing
a family CEO is 29% when the eldest child is female, but 39% when the eldest child is male, suggesting that
founding families are more likely to maintain control when they have sons. Bertrand et al. (2008) document a
positive association between family size and family ownership and control. Such evidence is corroborated by
anecdotal evidence and reﬂects the general culture of letting the son take over the family business. In addition,
Bertrand and Schoar (2006) suggest that the family values in a culture play an important role in shaping how
businesses are organized and their eﬃciency.
At the macro level, family ownership is found to be related to the institutional and market environment.
Burkart et al. (2003) show that family ownership is negatively correlated with the level of investor protection
in a country: when investor protection is weak, family ownership is high. In their international study, Franks
et al. (2012) observe that family ﬁrms gradually evolve into widely held companies in countries with developed
ﬁnancial markets and strong investor protection. In contrast, family control is prevalent in countries with less
developed ﬁnancial markets and weak investor protection.
Studies of how family business groups are structured come to a similar conclusion: pyramids are formed to
allow a family to achieve control of the business group using only a small cash ﬂow stake (e.g., Claessens et al.,
2000; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006). In an empirical study of family-controlled business groups in 45 coun-
tries, Masulis et al. (2011) document that family groups, especially those structured as pyramids, are more pre-
valent in markets with low capital availability, suggesting that group structures emerge not only to maintain
control, but also to alleviate ﬁnancing constraints.
Additional evidence from King and Peng (2009) shows that family ownership concentration varies with
industry characteristics. Founding-family ﬁrms in cyclical, capital intensive, and growth businesses have sig-
niﬁcantly shorter control spans than other family ﬁrms.
In sum, whether the founding family can maintain control and high ownership depends on the level of
investor protection at the country level, the characteristics of the business at the industry level, the capital
needs at the ﬁrm level, and the structure of the founding family at the family level.3. Family ﬁrms and family ﬁrm research in China
The above discussion focuses primarily on studies using U.S. data and some international studies. In this
section, we brieﬂy discuss the characteristics of Chinese family ﬁrms and review the literature on these ﬁrms in
the area of accounting and ﬁnance.3.1. Family ﬁrms in China
Compared to family ﬁrms listed on the U.S. exchanges, Chinese family ﬁrms are still at an early stage. Since
China started to transform from a planned economy to a socialist market economy in 1992, family ﬁrms have
grown rapidly in both prevalence and size. To obtain a basic understanding of the characteristics of Chinese
family ﬁrms, we examine those listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges in the 2003–2012
period.8 Because Chinese listed ﬁrms have been required to disclose their control structure and ultimate own-
ership since 2003, our sample period starts in that year. Disclosure of the control structure makes it possible to8 We only include A-share family ﬁrms here. There are only about eight B-share family ﬁrms and most of them also issue A-shares.
Table 1
The distribution of Chinese family ﬁrms.
Year Chinese listed ﬁrms Family listed ﬁrms Type of founding family owner
Chinese citizen Hong Kong/Macao/
Taiwan/overseas citizen
Panel A. Chinese family ﬁrms clustered by year
2003 1249 170 157 13
2004 1349 329 312 17
2005 1346 349 331 18
2006 1406 430 405 25
2007 1520 514 483 31
2008 1597 574 537 37
2009 1684 661 618 43
2010 2031 961 902 59
2011 2303 1243 1171 72
2012 2460 1373 1284 89
Panel B. Chinese family ﬁrms clustered by industry
Industry N Industry N Industry N
Agriculture 24 Iron/steel mills 107 Trade 55
Mining 19 Machinery 309 Banking/insurance 7
Brewage/food 51 Pharmaceutical 95 Real estate 66
Textile/apparel 52 Other manufacturing 23 Tourism 39
Wood/furniture 12 Utilities 8 Media 12
Paper/printing 31 Construction 26 Conglomerate 18
Petro-chemical 155 Transportation 10
Electronic 108 Telecommunication 146 Total 1373
Panel C. Chinese family ﬁrms clustered by province
Province N Province N Province N
Anhui 36 Heilongjiang 16 Shanxi 7
Beijing 94 Hubei 41 Shanxi 9
Chongqing 16 Hunan 35 Shanghai 79
Fujian 59 Jilin 18 Sichuan 55
Gansu 11 Jiangsu 169 Tianjin 9
Guangdong 250 Jiangxi 12 Xizang 7
Guangxi 15 Liaoning 36 Xinjiang 12
Guizhou 6 Neimeng 14 Yunnan 6
Hainan 17 Ningxia 6 Zhejiang 188
Hebei 23 Qinghai 5
Henan 34 Shandong 88 Total 1373
Note: The sample consists of ﬁrms issuing A-shares and listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges in the 2003–2012 period. Industry
classiﬁcation is based on the industry classiﬁcation guideline issued by the China Security Regulation Committee.
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deﬁnition as discussed in Section 1 to classify family ﬁrms.9
3.1.1. The distribution of Chinese family ﬁrms
Table 1 presents the distribution of Chinese family ﬁrms. Several features emerge. First, the majority of
Chinese family ﬁrms are founded by mainland Chinese citizens. A small proportion of them are controlled
by citizens from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, or overseas (Table 1, Panel A).109 This deﬁnition is diﬀerent from others in that it extends the deﬁnition of “family” to include not only founding families but also
individual investors or families that are not (related to) the founder. See Villalonga and Amit (2010, p. 867).
10 Note that based on the data available from the database, it is impossible to completely separate ﬁrms into single-family ﬁrms, multi-
family ﬁrms (where founders are not related to each other), and multi-generation family ﬁrms (held by multiple members of the same
family). It is also diﬃcult to identify ﬁrms controlled by the founder or the descendent. Such data need to be hand-collected.
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years. This is consistent with the notion that the Chinese stock market was established to help state-owned
ﬁrms to obtain capital and to reform, and that it was diﬃcult for family ﬁrms to obtain IPO approval from
the regulators in the early years. From 1992 to 2002, 17% of IPOs are family ﬁrms (not tabulated). The num-
ber of family ﬁrm IPOs gradually increased after May 2004 when the small- and medium-sized enterprise
board was established and increased dramatically after October 2009 when the growth enterprise board
was founded. As shown in Panel A of Table 1, the number of Chinese family listed ﬁrms increased from
170 in 2003 to 1373 in 2012. Given the strict IPO criteria for family ﬁrms in the early years, most of them went
public by taking over a listed ﬁrm and then relying on the seasoned equity oﬀerings to obtain capital.
Third, although family ﬁrms operate in a wide range of industries, most are in industries that have enjoyed
growth in recent years, such as petro-chemical, electronic, iron/steel mills, machinery, pharmaceutical, tele-
communication, and real estate (see Panel B of Table 1).
Fourth, most Chinese family ﬁrms are clustered in the more developed provinces, as shown in Panel C of
Table 1. Over 60% of Chinese family ﬁrms are located in coastal provinces and regions: Guangdong (250),
Zhejiang (188), Jiangsu (169), Beijing (94), Shandong (88), and Shanghai (79). Very few family ﬁrms are
located in interior provinces such as Qinghai (5), Ningxia (6), Yunnan (6), and Guizhou (6). The heteroge-
neous marketization across provinces provides a good opportunity to study how the institutional and market
environment aﬀects Chinese family ﬁrms. Are family ﬁrms the main driver of growth in the region, or does the
infrastructure in the region help the growth of family ﬁrms? Does the social and commercial culture aﬀect the
formation and evolvement of family ﬁrms?
3.1.2. Ownership structure, corporate governance and ﬁnancial characteristics
Table 2 presents some basic descriptive statistics for Chinese family ﬁrms. Several points are noteworthy.
First, Panel A of Table 2 shows that Chinese family ﬁrms have average assets of US$393.3 million (median
of US$206.7 million) and an average market value of US$594.2 million (median of US$324.3 million).11 Chen
et al. (2008a) report that during the 1996–2000 period, S&P 1500 ﬁrms had average assets of US$1,152.9 mil-
lion (median of US$982.4 million) and an average market value of US$6266 million (median of US$1150 mil-
lion). In terms of proﬁtability, the average return on assets of Chinese family ﬁrms is 3.36% (median of 4.39%),
while the average return on assets in the S&P 1500 family ﬁrms is 5% (median of 6%). With respect to growth
opportunities, the average market to book ratio is 4.32 (median of 3.19) for Chinese family ﬁrms and 4.31
(median of 2.64) for S&P 1500 family ﬁrms. While not exactly comparable, Chinese family ﬁrms are smaller
and less proﬁtable and have higher growth than their U.S. counterparts.
Second, the ownership concentration is very high in Chinese family ﬁrms. Panel B of Table 2 shows that the
average ownership among family owners is 34.59% (median of 31.36%), which is about twice the proportion
among S&P 1500 family owners (Chen et al., 2008a). Considering the pyramid structure, Chinese founding
families own an average of 28.32% (median of 24.74%) of the cash ﬂow rights and 36.44% (median of
33.33%) of the voting right in their ﬁrms, while Villalonga and Amit (2009) report that the founding families
of Fortune 500 companies own an average of 15.3% of the shares and 18.8% of the votes in their ﬁrms.12
Chinese family ﬁrms present a much higher level of ownership concentration and higher degrees of separation
between cash ﬂow rights and voting rights.13
Third, as Panel B of Table 2 shows, only 30% of CEOs in family ﬁrms serve as the Chairman of the board in
Chinese family ﬁrms.14 A typical board has nine members, three of whom are independent. This fraction is
much lower than it is in U.S. family ﬁrms. Chen et al. (2008a) report that 62% of the directors on the boards11 We use the oﬃcial 2012 exchange rate of US$1 = RMB6.39.
12 If a family owns 60% of ﬁrm A, which then owns 40% of ﬁrm B, which is listed on one of the exchanges, then the family’s direct
ownership in ﬁrm B is considered to be 40% and the cash ﬂow right in ﬁrm B is considered to be 24% (=60%  40%). These terms are
commonly used in the literature on pyramid structures. The direct ownership and cash ﬂow right are naturally the same in cases without a
pyramid structure. Cash ﬂow rights diﬀer from voting rights when some shares have diﬀerent voting and cash ﬂow rights.
13 The ownership, cash ﬂow rights, and voting rights reported here are those of the controlling family owners. Because family ownership
consists of controlling ownership and other family ownership, the amounts of family ownership, family cash ﬂow rights, and family voting
rights would be even greater than those reported here.
14 Recently, the founder of the Alibaba Group, Ma Yun, resigned from the CEO position while still serving as the chairman of the board.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for Chinese family ﬁrms.
Family ﬁrms Non-family ﬁrms p-Value for the diﬀerences
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A. Financial characteristics
Assets ($million) 393.32 206.67 2,349.77 397.65 0.000 0.000
Sales ($million) 244.11 110.39 992.83 230.44 0.000 0.000
Market value ($million) 594.24 324.28 2,637.48 560.12 0.000 0.000
Debt ratio 0.49 0.43 0.53 0.53 0.000 0.000
ROA (%) 3.36 4.39 2.76 2.92 0.000 0.000
ROE (%) 5.81 7.49 4.93 6.64 0.003 0.000
Market to book ratio 4.32 3.19 3.61 2.57 0.974 0.000
Tobin’s q 1.94 1.43 1.54 1.22 0.000 0.000
Panel B. Ownership structure and corporate governance
Family direct ownership (%) 34.59 31.36
Family cash ﬂow rights (%) 28.32 24.74
Family voting rights (%) 36.44 33.33
CEO duality 0.30 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.000 0.000
Board size 8.64 9.00 9.68 9.00 0.000 0.000
Board independence 0.37 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.000 0.000
Incentive plan 0.21 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.000 0.000
Note: The sample consists of ﬁrms issuing A-shares and listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges in the 2003–2012 period. Assets is
the total assets at the year-end. Sales is the total sales during year t. Market value is the market value of common stock plus the market
value of debt, where the value of non-tradable stock and non-tradable debt is measured by book value. Debt ratio is the ratio of debt to
total assets at the year-end. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets in year t. ROE is the ratio of net income to equity in year t.
Market to book ratio is the ratio of the market value of the tradable stock to the book value of the stock. Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market
value to the book value of total assets. Direct ownership is the ownership held by the controlling shareholder. Cash ﬂow rights is the
product of the ownership stakes along the control chain. If an ultimate owner controls a ﬁrm via multiple control chains, cash ﬂow rights is
the sum of the products of the ownership stakes along each chain. Voting rights is the weakest link in the control chain. If an ultimate
owner controls a ﬁrm via multiple control chains, voting rights is the sum of voting rights along each chain. CEO duality is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the CEO also serves as the chairman, and 0 otherwise. Board size is the number of directors serving on the board.
Board independence is the ratio of independent directors to the total number of directors. Incentive plan is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the ﬁrm has a stock incentive plan in place for the top executives. The variables are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
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mented equity-based incentive plans for their CEOs.
Fourth, compared to non-family ﬁrms, family ﬁrms are smaller and have lower leverage, better perfor-
mance, and higher growth potential. Family ﬁrms are also more likely to have CEOs serving as the chairman
of the board, have smaller boards, and are more likely to use incentive-based compensation for their CEOs.
These statistics suggest that Chinese family ﬁrms are smaller and younger than U.S. ﬁrms. At this stage, the
ownership, control, and management are mainly centralized in the hands of the founders and their immediate
family members. The family members of Chinese founding families are likely to have much greater inﬂuence
on their ﬁrms’ corporate governance and ﬁnancial decisions than family members of U.S. family ﬁrms. Hence,
the “family eﬀect” is likely to be much more prominent in Chinese than in U.S. family ﬁrms.3.2. Chinese family ﬁrm research
To date, there are very few studies of Chinese family ﬁrms. A search on Google Scholar for studies pub-
lished in the international accounting and ﬁnancial journals15 revealed only three papers that focus exclusively15 The academic accounting journals include The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Journal of Accounting Research,
Review of Accounting Studies, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting & Public Policy, Journal of Accounting, Auditing
and Finance, and Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. The academic ﬁnancial journals include Journal of Finance, Journal of
Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of
Corporate Finance and FinancialManagement. Because the Asia-Paciﬁc Journal of Accounting & Economics andChina Journal of Accounting
Research mainly focus on the Asia-Paciﬁc and Chinese markets, we also include these two journals in the Google search.
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and non-SOE ﬁrms, most of which are family ﬁrms. Research on family ﬁrms is also limited in the Chinese
academic journals. This lack of research is puzzling given how prevalent Chinese family ﬁrms are and how
diﬀerent SOEs and family ﬁrms are in terms of their ownership structures and managers’ incentives. Below
we discuss some important ﬁndings based on these studies and oﬀer some suggestions for future research.
3.2.1. Corporate valuation and ﬁrm performance
Similar to those in the U.S. market, Chinese family ﬁrms outperform non-family ﬁrms in the Chinese mar-
kets. Allen et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the private sector in China grows much faster than other sectors and is the
primary driver behind most of the country’s economic growth. Similarly, Chen et al. (2008b) document that
when control of a ﬁrm is passed to a private entity, the ﬁrm’s performance improves.
Given that family ﬁrms perform better than non-family ﬁrms, one natural question is why family ﬁrms are
more eﬃcient in an economy where the legal and market environments are far from perfect. This question is
particularly interesting because SOEs enjoy most of the ﬁnancing and political advantages. One possible rea-
son is the better incentive mechanism in Chinese family ﬁrms, although the evidence is scarce at the moment.
Some studies argue that Chinese family ﬁrms establish incentive systems for proﬁt maximization. Firth et al.
(2006) ﬁnd that ﬁrms owned by private blockholders link the CEO’s pay to stock and accounting performance.
Chen et al. (2012b) ﬁnd that family ﬁrms use relative performance evaluation for top executives’ compensa-
tion. Cheng et al. (2008) ﬁnd that turnovers in family ﬁrms are negatively associated with core earnings. More
research can be done to examine whether there are other drivers of family ﬁrms’ outperformance.
3.2.2. Type II agency problems in Chinese family ﬁrms
Some recent studies examine Type II agency problem in Chinese family ﬁrms. Compared to SOEs, family
ﬁrms appear to be less likely to use related party transactions for “tunneling” (Peng et al., 2011; Ying and
Wang, 2013). However, Chinese family owners have a signiﬁcant wedge between voting rights and cash ﬂow
rights, which can motivate the founding family to tunnel corporate resources at the expenses of minority
shareholders.
To date, most of the studies examining Type II agency problems in family ﬁrms are published in Chinese
journals. The general conclusions are as follows: (1) founding families use group companies, internal capital
markets, and pyramid structures to tunnel resources from their listed companies (Shao and Liu 2007; Liu
et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2010); (2) the investment eﬃciency is low in family ﬁrms where the founding family
has excessive control rights and low cash ﬂow rights (Han et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2012a); and (3) family ﬁrms
have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and a lower propensity to pay dividends than non-family ﬁrms (Wei
et al., 2011). Extant studies also examine the consequences of such agency problems and they ﬁnd that (1) fam-
ily ﬁrms with a higher degree of separation between control and cash ﬂow rights are associated with lower ﬁrm
value (Su and Zhu, 2003; Zhang et al., 2004; Ye et al., 2007; Yang and Su, 2009); (2) family ﬁrms with a multi-
ple-layer corporate structure and a higher degree of separation between control and cash ﬂow rights are asso-
ciated with higher bid-ask spreads (Lei et al., 2013); and (3) auditors charge higher fees for family ﬁrms that
have a higher degree of separation between control and cash ﬂow rights, a disproportionally high number of
family directors on the board, and a family member as the CEO (Hu et al., 2012; Liu and Subramaniam,
2013).
3.2.3. Financial reporting quality
In contrast to their counterparts in the U.S. market, Chinese family ﬁrms exhibit lower ﬁnancial reporting
quality than non-family ﬁrms. Huang and Zhang (2011) and Wang and Yung (2011) document that Chinese
family ﬁrms have higher abnormal accruals, lower earnings predictability, and lower conservatism. They attri-
bute their ﬁndings to the weak investor protection in China and Type II agency problems in family ﬁrms. In
contrast, Xu and Lv (2011) indicate that when family members are appointed as top executives, ﬁnancial
reporting quality is higher.
Some studies examine how market intermediaries aﬀect the extent of earnings management. Chen et al.
(2011a) ﬁnd that the eﬀects of audit quality on earnings management and the cost of equity capital are more
pronounced for non-SOEs (primarily family ﬁrms) than for SOEs. Chen et al. (2013b) also ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly
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This negative relationship is due either to reputable underwriters’ selection process or to their active monitor-
ing and intervention in the pre-IPO stage.
3.2.4. Financing decision and the governance structure of family ﬁrms
The Chinese capital markets are characterized by (1) an uneven level of marketization across provinces; (2)
weak investor protection and legal infrastructure; (3) strong governmental intervention; (4) uneven resource
allocation between SOEs and non-SOEs; and (5) a lack of trust among market participants. These character-
istics aﬀect the formation and development of Chinese family ﬁrms.
In terms of ﬁnancing, Chinese family ﬁrms achieve tremendous growth despite the limited support from
state-owned banks. This ﬁnding provides a unique setting to test how ﬁrms in a country with poorly developed
ﬁnancial institutions fund their growth opportunities. Ge and Qiu (2007) ﬁnd that compared to SOEs, non-
SOEs use more trade credit for ﬁnancing. Lu et al. (2012) ﬁnd that non-SOEs have a greater propensity to
hold signiﬁcant ownership in commercial banks, and such ownership helps them to reduce interest expenses
and obtain short-term loans when the government’s monetary policy is tight.
The uneven resource allocation system in China also motivates Chinese family ﬁrms to establish political
connections. Chen et al. (2011c) ﬁnd that in regions where the local economy is less market-oriented or where
the government has more discretion in allocating economic resources, non-SOEs are more likely to establish
political connections. Wu et al. (2012) also show that family ﬁrms with politically connected managers enjoy
tax beneﬁts and outperform those without such managers.
In terms of governance structure, Li et al. (2008) ﬁnd that the discrimination of state-owned banks against
non-SOEs encourages the founding families to build a pyramid ownership structure to reduce their ﬁnancial
constraints. Chen et al. (2011b) ﬁnd that the layers of pyramids and the wedge between voting and cash ﬂow
rights decrease with the quality of government services. The early stage of Chinese family ﬁrms and the poor
legal infrastructure in China provide great opportunities for future research to examine how the governance
structure of family ﬁrms evolves.
3.2.5. The allocation and eﬀects of family authority
Although it is widely accepted that the involvement of family members in the family business is the most
unique feature of family ﬁrms (Chua et al., 1999), little research has been done in this area. Data availability is
the biggest challenge. Nevertheless, as suggested above, Chinese family ﬁrms are still young and family mem-
bers still hold large ownerships and are involved in their ﬁrms’ boards and management teams. These unique
attributes provide great opportunities to explore how the founding family controls the ﬁrm, how the allocation
of family authority aﬀects operating eﬃciency and corporate governance, and how the conﬂicts among family
members aﬀect ﬁrm operations. Field research and case studies might be more appropriate for such research
than a large sample study.
Some recent studies have started to explore these issues. He et al. (2010a,b) and He and Lian (2009) exam-
ine the composition of family ﬁrms in terms of core family members, close relatives, and distant relatives. Lian
et al. (2011) ﬁnd that ownership of the ﬁrm is more likely to be held by core family members, but only capable
family members or professional CEOs are assigned to the management team. He and Lian (2009) and He et al.
(2010b) show that conﬂicts among family members are induced when a family member’s ownership and man-
agement position do not match, and such conﬂicts reduce ﬁrm value. He et al. (2010a,b) find that the conﬂict
among core family members is the lowest, and the majority of conﬂicts are between distant relatives or
between close and distant relatives. These studies collectively provide some initial evidence on how the char-
acteristics of the founding family aﬀect the ownership, corporate governance, and valuation of a family
business.
4. Concluding remarks and opportunities for future research
Family ﬁrms are very common around the world. Founding family ownership exhibits unique characteris-
tics. Family owners have concentrated and under-diversiﬁed ownership. They also have longer investment
horizons than other shareholders, including other blockholders. Family owners are usually actively involved
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less severe agency conﬂicts between owners and managers, but more severe agency conﬂicts between family
owners and non-family minority shareholders. Family ﬁrms are also aﬀected by the tensions or conﬂicts
among family members. These agency conﬂicts aﬀect the operations, ﬁnancial reporting, and valuation of fam-
ily ﬁrms.
The low-hanging fruits have been picked in the last decade, although opportunities for further research still
bound. First, it would be of particular interest to explore the potentially “disguised” family eﬀects. Some phe-
nomena documented in prior research might be due to family ﬁrm eﬀects. For example, many studies have
examined the eﬀect of a dual class structure. However, as most dual class shares are owned by founding family
members, is it possible to separate the dual class eﬀect from the family ﬁrm eﬀect?
Second, the founding family is treated as a black box and is assumed to be homogeneous. As indicated by
Bertrand and Schoar (2006), “much can be learned by investigating the ‘family’ part of ‘family ﬁrms’.” Under-
standing the nexus within the family and its inﬂuence on ﬁrm operations would move the literature forward.
Such studies would also be useful for family owners in improving the governance, succession planning, and
operations of their ﬁrms.
Third, more data are needed to provide additional insights. An interesting example along this line is a study
by Bunkanwanicha et al. (2013). They compile a unique and comprehensive data set of family ﬁrms in Thai-
land and ﬁnd that family ﬁrms’ stock prices increase when one family member marries a member from a prom-
inent business or political family.
Fourth, case studies are quite limited in the family ﬁrm literature and might provide the most value-added
in future research. While such studies are more diﬃcult to publish due to the lack of generalizability, the col-
lective evidence from such studies can provide much needed insights into the operation of family ﬁrms and
provide guidance for family owners who are concerned with governance, operation, and succession.
Finally, international studies are helpful in understanding how diﬀerent cultural norms and legal infrastruc-
tures aﬀect the evolvement of family ﬁrms. Morck et al. (2011), Masulis et al. (2011), and Franks et al. (2012)
are some recent examples. Of course, both authors and readers must be mindful of the heterogeneity across
countries, which imposes challenges for research design and might aﬀect the interpretation of results.
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